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Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, 913 F.3d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
F. Aaron Rains
In Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, the Hoopa Valley Tribe
challenged the intentional and continual delay of state water quality
certification review of water discharged from a series of dams on the
Klamath River in California and Oregon. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, the states of Oregon and California, and PacifiCorp, a
hydroelectric operator, were implementing an administrative scheme
designed to circumvent a one-year temporal requirement for review
imposed on states by the Clean Water Act. This scheme allowed
PacifiCorp to operate the series of dams for over a decade without proper
state water quality certification. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held in favor of the Hoopa Valley Tribe
and vacated FERC’s ruling while also holding that Oregon and California
had waived their Section 401 water quality certification authority.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Hoopa Valley Tribe (“Hoopa Tribe” or “Hoopa”) petitioned
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
(“the court”) to review orders issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) that found California and Oregon (“States”) had
not waived their Clean Water Act (“CWA”) Section 401 water quality
certification authority (“Section 401 authority”) and that PacifiCorp had
properly executed their dam operation relicensing application.1 The Hoopa
Tribe presented three arguments: 1) the States had waived their Section
401 authority by exceeding the one-year statutorily mandated review
period; 2) PacifiCorp had not diligently applied for relicensing; and 3)
FERC failed in performing its regulatory duty.2 Holding that the States had
waived their Section 401 authority pursuant to the explicit language of
Section 401 itself, the court vacated and remanded FERC’s ruling and
ordered FERC to “proceed with its review of, and licensing determination
for, the Klamath Hydroelectric Project.”3
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case dealt with the licensing and potential decommissioning
of a series of dams along the Klamath River in Oregon and California.4
The original license to operate the dams was issued in 1954 and expired in
2006, and PacifiCorp––the current dam operator––subsequently
maintained operation on an annual, interim licensing scheme.5 Several of
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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the dams on the lower reaches of the Klamath are outdated and do not
comply with current environmental standards, thereby preventing CWA
compliance and inhibiting long-term operational licensure.6 To remedy
this issue, PacifiCorp determined to decommission those non-compliant
dams while keeping the compliant, upper-river dams in operation.7
PacifiCorp submitted a relicensing application and proposal to FERC and
met all of the relicensing requirements, except the state water quality
requirement per Section 401 of the CWA.8
In 2008, the States, Tribal representatives, farmers, ranchers,
conservation groups, fishermen, and PacifiCorp entered into negotiations
regarding the dam decommissioning process for the lower dams.9 In 2010,
the negotiations resulted in the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement
Agreement (“KHSA"), which included “a series of interim environmental
measures and funding obligations [imposed on PacifiCorp],” and set a
potential 2020 decommission date for the non-compliant dams.10
Under the KHSA, California, Oregon, and PacifiCorp agreed to
circumvent a one-year statutory limit imposed on states by the CWA for
review of an entity’s Section 401 compliance by allowing PacifiCorp to
repeatedly withdraw and resubmit their 401 water quality requests to
continually renew the state period of review.11 Additionally, the KHSA
“explicitly required the abeyance of all state permitting reviews” while the
withdrawal and resubmission was occurring.12 These tactics were designed
to prevent the States from waiving their Section 401 certification authority,
thus ensuring the vitality of the project.13
The KHSA also included various “preconditions for
decommissioning,” including securing federal funding for the project,
which ultimately never occurred.14 As a result, the parties amended the
KHSA to split the licensing of the lower, non-compliant dams from the
upper dams.15 The amended KHSA was designed to transfer
decommissioning-related licensing and liability exposure to a separate
entity: the Klamath River Renewal Corporation (“KRRC”).16
In late 2016, PacifiCorp applied to FERC for an amended license,
which would create a new, separate license exclusively for the lower dams
and facilitate transfer of lower-dam management to KRRC.17 After review,
FERC issued a new license for the lower dams, effectively separating them
from the upper dams, but it did not approve transfer of the new license to
6.
7.
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KRRC.18 As a result, PacifiCorp still held both the upper and lower dam
licenses.19
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2012, the Hoopa Tribe, whose reservation lies along the lower
reaches of the Klamath and were not party to the negotiations of the KSHA
or amended KHSA, petitioned FERC to declare that “California and
Oregon had waived their 401 certification authority and that PacifiCorp
had correspondingly failed to diligently prosecute its licensing application
for the Project.”20 In June 2014, FERC denied Hoopa’s petition, and
Hoopa subsequently requested a rehearing which was also denied.21 In late
2014, Hoopa petitioned the District Court for the District of Columbia to
review FERC’s orders.22 In light of the amended KHSA, the court held
Hoopa’s petition in abeyance for several years pending the supposed
forthcoming decommission of the lower dams.23 By May 2018, the
decommissioning still had not occurred, and the court removed Hoopa’s
case from abeyance and reviewed FERC’s orders.24
III. ANALYSIS
The court reviewed FERC’s order under the Administrative
Procedures Act which “empowers the court to reverse any decision that is
'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.’”25 Notably, the court did not give FERC’s
interpretation or conclusions regarding Section 401 of the CWA any
agency deference as it was “not the agency charged with administering the
CWA.” 26
A. Sovereign Immunity
As amicus curiae, the state of Oregon challenged the court’s
jurisdiction by asserting that California and Oregon had exercised their
sovereign immunity rights under the Eleventh Amendment by refusing to
intervene in the review process.27 Additionally, Oregon asserted that it was
an “indispensable party” because the review was, in part, an analysis of
whether Oregon and California had waived their Section 401 authority.28
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id. at 1102
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. (citing Wisconsin Valley Improvement v. FERC, 236 F.3d 738,
742, 344 U.S. App. D.C. 371 (Cir. 2001) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id. at 1102–03.
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Under this rationale, Oregon moved to dismiss the case, basing its
argument on Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.29
The court held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 does not control the issue in
question and that Oregon and California were not indispensable parties to
the case.30 Instead, the court determined that as an appellate review of an
agency action, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 “only requires the respondent federal
agency” to be party to a petition for review.31
Addressing Oregon’s sovereign immunity argument generally, the
court stated, “Oregon's position is incompatible with the precepts of
federalism and this Court's prior precedent.”32 Hoopa specifically
challenged a federal agency’s orders regarding application of the CWA, a
federal statute.33 Thus, the court held that as a federal court of appeal it
had proper jurisdiction over the matter.34
B. Waiver Under Section 401
Hoopa sought relief under three theories: 1) the States had waived
their Section 401 authority, 2) PacifiCorp failed to properly execute its
relicensing application, and 3) FERC failed to perform its regulatory
duty.35 The court narrowed these arguments into a single issue: whether
the States waived their Section 401 authority by allowing PacifiCorp to
repeatedly withdraw and submit their request for Section 401 water quality
certification to avoid exceeding the one-year deadline.36
The court held that the “temporal element” of Section 401 is
explicit in stating: “[if the state] … fails or refuses to act on a request for
certification, within a reasonable time (which shall not exceed one
year).”37 Specifically, the court focused on the “act on a request” language,
observing that FERC used this language to allow the States to treat each
new request that PacifiCorp made individually, thus restarting the clock
on the one-year statutory maximum and, in turn, allowing the States to
retain their Section 401 authority.38 In doing so, the court found that FERC
had acted arbitrarily and capriciously by determining that the States had
not ‘failed to act’ pursuant to Section 401.39
Additionally, the court found that PacifiCorp never intended to
submit an entirely new application for Section 401 certification to the
States, and that the “withdrawal-and-resubmission” arrangement made
under the KHSA was designed to “circumvent congressionally granted
29.
Id. at 1103.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id. (citing City of Tacoma v. FERC, 460 F.3d 53, 373 U.S. App. D.C.
117 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)).
38.
Id. at 1104.
39.
Id.
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authority over the licensing, conditioning and developing of a
hydroelectric project.”40 Further, the court noted that it had repeatedly
found that Congress intended Section 401 “to prevent a State from
indefinitely delaying a federal licensing proceeding”––however, it
acknowledged that it had never addressed a case with the exact factual
scenario presented here.41
In a supplemental brief, FERC argued that the Second Circuit had
suggested that “in light of various practical difficulties . . . a state could
‘request that the applicant withdraw and resubmit the application.’”42 The
court found that the Second Circuit’s dicta was not central to their holding
in that case, and was made only to “rebut state agency fears” that the oneyear review period could result in error during the review process.43 The
court noted that PacifiCorp’s Section 401 request to the States had been
“complete and ready for review for more than a decade,” and such state
agency fears were not applicable to current case.44 Therefore, the court
found there was no legal basis for an exception to the one-year review
period and held that California and Oregon had waived their Section 401
statutory authority over the project.45
C. Futility
FERC argued that if the States had waived their Section 401
authority, FERC would be required to deny PacifiCorp’s license, and in
turn PacifiCorp would be required to file a decommissioning plan for all
of the Klamath dams.46 The decommissioning of the dams would result in
a “discharge into navigable waters” which would trigger Section 401 and
require water quality certification from the States.47 Thus, the States not
timely reviewing PacifiCorp’s request for water quality certification
would necessitate the States perform a water quality review so that the
dams could be decommissioned.48 FERC argued that this was a futile,
circular sequence of events, and that it would result in delays not in the
public interest.49
The court acknowledged FERC’s concerns of further delay but
held that they did not “trump express statutory directives.”50 Additionally,
the court noted that, had FERC found that the States had waived their
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 1104–05 (quoting Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC, 643
F.3d 963, 972-73, 395 U.S. App. D.C. 425 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Millennium Pipeline Co.
v. Seggos, 860 F.3d 696, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
42.
Id. at 1105 (citing New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v.
FERC, 884 F.3d 450, 455-56 (2d Cir. 2018)).
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
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47.
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Section 401 authority when the one-year maximum had run over a decade
ago, decommissioning would likely already be underway. 51 Further, the
court addressed FERC’s prominent, and asserted role in “protecting the
public interest in hydropower projects” by participating in discussion
regarding proposed settlements resulting from the development and
decommission of hydroelectric projects.52 The court noted that FERC had
neglected this role by underrepresenting the interests of Hoopa during the
negotiation of both the KHSA and the amended KHSA, and in any related
settlement agreements.53 Therefore, the court disagreed that finding a
waiver of state authority would be futile, as it would ultimately allow
Hoopa and FERC to become party to the negotiations and discussions
regarding the Klamath River dams.54
IV. CONCLUSION
The court’s holding in this case is a victory for the Hoopa Tribe
and other traditionally underrepresented groups nationwide. Indigenous
peoples have a place at the negotiating table when federal projects affect
reservation land and specifically, that FERC’s role in protecting the public
interest is an important part of the process. The court’s holding also
reinforces the power of explicit, statutory language used in congressional
acts, and highlights the necessity for clear and consistent language that
directly expresses the intent of congress. Additionally, the court exposes a
willingness of the state, federal, and private entities involved to exploit
perceived loopholes in federal statues, namely the CWA. Finally, this
holding highlights the effectiveness of the legal system by illustrating the
process of administratively and legally challenging agency rulings and
orders that are perceived to be unjust.

51.
Id.
52.
Id. at 1105 (citing Settlements in Hydropower Licensing Proceedings
under Part I of the Federal Power Act, 116 FERC ¶ 61270, 62086 (Sept. 1, 2006); U.S.
Dep't of Interior v. FERC, 952 F.2d 538, 540, 293 U.S. App. D.C. 182 (D.C. Cir.
1992)).
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 1106

